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Abstract
In a general model of asymmetric-information bargaining with in-
dependent private values and quasilinear utilities, there exists an e¢ -
cient incentive-compatible and individually rational bargaining mecha-
nism when the status-quo allocation is the expected e¢ cient allocation.
The only assumption needed for this is that the total surplus is convex in
the allocation (which holds as long as randomized allocations are allowed).
1 Introduction
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) ￿rst demonstrated, in a bilateral trading set-
ting, that private information and property rights may make it impossible for
parties to bargain towards fully e¢ cient trade. (Mailath and Postlewaite (1990)
showed a similar result for public good provision.) Cramton et al. (1987) showed
that in the problem of allocating a divisible good to the highest-value agent, e¢ -
ciency can be achieved with symmetric agents when the status-quo allocation of
the good is close enough to equal shares. Schmitz (2002) demonstrated other ex-
amples in which e¢ cient bargaining is possible, while Neeman (1999) considered
a pollution model in which the existence of an e¢ ciency-permitting status-quo
allocation depended on some parameters. Schweizer (2006, Proposition 2) estab-
lished the existence of an e¢ ciency-permitting status-quo allocation in a model
that generalized the preceding ones.
This note contributes to the literature by describing a status-quo allocation
that allows e¢ cient bargaining in a very general model, which strictly generalizes
all the preceding models for which existence has been shown. In contrast to
Schweizer￿ s result, we explicitly describe a status-quo allocation that permits
e¢ cient bargaining ￿it is the expectation of the ex post e¢ cient allocation.
The only assumption needed (in addition to the quasilinearity of payo⁄s and
independent private values) is that the total surplus is convex in the allocation.
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12 The Model and Result
Consider I expected-utility maximizing agents whose utilities are quasilinear
in money. The set of non-monetary allocations X is a subset of a measurable
topological vector space. The agents￿ privately observed types are indepen-
dently distributed random variables ~ ￿1;:::;~ ￿I with values in measurable spaces
￿1;:::;￿I respectively. The state space is thus ￿ = ￿1 ￿:::￿￿I. The utility
of each agent i is given by ui (x;￿i) + ti, where ti 2 R is the payment to the
agent, x 2 X is the nonmonetary allocation, and ￿i 2 ￿i is the agent￿ s type.
The functions ui : X ￿ ￿i ! R are measurable and uniformly bounded (i.e.,
supi;x;￿ jui (x;￿i)j < 1).1
Proposition 1 Suppose that the total surplus s(x;￿) ￿
X
i
ui (x;￿i) is convex
in x for all ￿: Suppose that ￿￿ : ￿ ! X is an e¢ cient allocation rule, i.e.,
s(￿￿ (￿);￿) = S (￿) ￿ maxx2X s(x;￿) for all ￿, and that the status-quo allo-
cation is b x ￿ E[￿￿(~ ￿)] 2 X. Then there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible
and interim individually rational mechanism implementing allocation rule ￿￿ in
which the total expected payment to the agents is nonpositive.
Proof. Consider the direct mechanism h￿￿;￿i that, given announcements ￿ =
(￿1;:::;￿I), implements allocation ￿￿(￿) and makes a payment to each agent i
of
￿i(￿) =
X
j6=i
uj (￿￿ (￿);￿j) ￿ inf
b ￿i2￿i
￿
E~ ￿￿i
h
S(b ￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
￿ ui(b x;b ￿i)
￿
: (1)
First, note that this is a VCG mechanism, hence the mechanism is dominant-
strategy and therefore Bayesian incentive compatible. Next, the interim net
expected utility of type ￿i of agent i in the mechanism (that is, this agent￿ s
surplus over his utility from the status quo) is
E~ ￿￿i
h
ui(￿￿(￿i;~ ￿￿i);￿i) + ￿i(￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
￿ ui (b x;￿i)
= E~ ￿￿i
h
S(￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
￿ ui (b x;￿i) ￿ inf
b ￿i2￿i
￿
E~ ￿￿i
h
S(b ￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
￿ ui(b x;b ￿i)
￿
￿ 0:
Finally, the ex ante expected payment to agent i is bounded above as follows
E
h
￿i(~ ￿)
i
= sup
b ￿i2￿i
E
2
4
X
j6=i
uj
￿
￿￿(~ ￿);~ ￿j
￿
￿ S(b ￿i;~ ￿￿i) + ui(b x;b ￿i)
3
5
￿ sup
b ￿i2￿i
E
2
4
X
j6=i
uj
￿
￿￿(~ ￿);~ ￿j
￿
￿ s
￿
￿￿(~ ￿);(b ￿i;~ ￿￿i)
￿
+ ui(b x;b ￿i)
3
5
= sup
b ￿i2￿i
E
h
ui(b x;b ￿i) ￿ ui(￿￿(~ ￿);b ￿i)
i
;
1The last two assumptions ensure that expectations exist and that the inf in the proof of
the Proposition is ￿nite.
2where the inequality holds by de￿nition of S(b ￿i;~ ￿￿i). Adding up over i and
using Jensen￿ s inequality yields
E
"
X
i
￿i(~ ￿)
#
￿ sup
b ￿2￿
E
h
s(b x;b ￿) ￿ s(￿￿(~ ￿);b ￿)
i
￿ 0: (2)
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of the Proposition, for the status-quo al-
location b x = E[￿￿(~ ￿)] there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible and interim
individually rational mechanism h￿￿; i implementing the e¢ cient allocation
rule ￿￿ in which the total payment to the agents is zero in all states.
Proof. For each i, let
 i (￿) ￿ E~ ￿￿i
h
￿i(￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
￿
1
I ￿ 1
X
j6=i
￿
E~ ￿￿j
h
￿j(￿j;~ ￿￿j)
i
￿ E
h
￿j(~ ￿)
i￿
￿
1
I
X
j
E
h
￿j(~ ￿)
i
:
By construction,
P
i  i(￿) = 0 for all ￿ 2 ￿. Also by construction, for all i, ￿i,
Ee ￿￿i
h
 i(￿i;e ￿￿i)
i
= E~ ￿￿i
h
￿i(￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
￿
1
I
E
2
4
X
j
￿j(~ ￿)
3
5;
hence mechanism h￿￿; i inherits Bayesian incentive compatibility of mechanism
h￿￿;￿i, and it also inherits interim individual rationality since we know that
E
hP
j ￿j(~ ￿)
i
￿ 0 for all j.
3 Remarks
3.1 Role of Convexity
When the allocation space X is not convex, an expected-e¢ cient allocation
E[￿￿(~ ￿)] need not lie in X, and if it does not then Proposition 1 does not apply:
Example 1 (Bilateral Trade) I = 2, each ~ ￿i is distributed on ￿i = [0;1]
according to a continuous strictly increasing c.d.f. Fi, X = f(1;0);(0;1)g, and
ui (x;￿i) = ￿ixi. In this setting, the e¢ cient allocation rule has ￿￿
i (￿) = 1
whenever ￿i > ￿￿i. By the Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem, neither possible
status-quo allocation allows e¢ cient bargaining.
Even with a convex allocation space X, the assumption of convexity of the
total surplus s(x;￿) in the allocation x is also crucial. Neeman (1999, p.685)
o⁄ers an example of pollution in which the convexity assumption fails and there
does not exist an e¢ ciency-permitting status-quo allocation.
On the other hand, both convexity assumptions are trivially ensured by al-
lowing randomized allocations, in which case we take X to be the space of prob-
ability distributions over a primitive set of pure allocations, and the agents￿
3expected utilities are linear in x. Allowing randomizations does not a⁄ect the
e¢ ciency of a deterministic allocation rule. but a randomized status quo allow-
ing e¢ cient bargaining will exist by Proposition 1. In Example 1, the space of
randomized allocations is the simplex X =
￿
(x1;x2) 2 R2
+ : x1 + x2 = 1
￿
, and
the utilities are linear in x, hence Proposition 1 applies.
3.2 Comparison to Schweizer￿ s (2006) Proposition 2
Schweizer￿ s approach may be described as follows: Consider an intermediary
who o⁄ers a mechanism h￿￿;￿i with the e¢ cient allocation rule ￿￿and payments
to each agent i of the form
￿i (￿) =
X
j6=i
uj (￿￿ (￿);￿j) ￿ E~ ￿￿i
h
S(b ￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
+ ui(b x;b ￿i) (3)
for some b x 2 X and b ￿ = (b ￿1;:::;b ￿I) 2 ￿. Note that this is a VCG mecha-
nism and that it makes the participation constraints of ￿critical types￿b ￿i bind
given the status-quo allocation b x. The intermediary￿ s expected pro￿t in this
mechanism is
￿(b x;b ￿) = ￿E
"
X
i
￿i(~ ￿)
#
= ￿(I ￿ 1)E
h
S(~ ￿)
i
+
X
i
E
h
S(b ￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
￿ s(b x;b ￿):
Now consider the maxmin program maxb x2X minb ￿2￿ ￿(b x;b ￿) in which the
intermediary ￿rst chooses the status-quo allocation b x and then an adversary
chooses the critical types b ￿. If the program has a saddle point (b x;b ￿) 2 X ￿ ￿,
then it is characterized by
b ￿i 2 arg min
￿i2￿i
E~ ￿￿i
h
S(￿i;~ ￿￿i)
i
￿ ui (b x;￿i) for all i; (4)
b x 2 argmin
x2X
s(x;b ￿) (5)
Condition (4) says that each agent i￿ s critical type b ￿i is his worst-o⁄ type in
the mechanism given the status-quo allocation b x. Condition (5) says that the
status-quo allocation b x minimizes the total surplus in the state in which the
agents have their critical types.
Schweizer imposes su¢ cient assumptions to ensure that a saddle point (b x;b ￿)
indeed exists ￿namely, he assumes that the sets of allocations X and of types
￿1;:::;￿I are convex and compact subsets of Euclidean spaces, that the total
surplus s(x;￿) is linear in types ￿, convex in allocations x, and continuous in
(x;￿).2 Then it can be seen that given status quo b x, and the payments described
by (3), h￿￿;￿i is a Bayesian incentive-compatible and interim individually ratio-
nal mechanism in which the total expected payment to the agents is nonpositive.
2Schweizer also assumes in footnotes 1 and 2 that the payo⁄s are continuously di⁄erentiable
in (x;￿) and the e¢ cient allocation rule ￿￿ is continuous a.e., but these assumptions do not
seem to play any role in his Proposition 2.
4To see this, ￿rst observe that under condition (4) the transfer rules (1) and (3)
coincide. Then follow the proof of Proposition 1, with the only di⁄erence being
that inequality (2) now follows from condition (5) rather than from b x being an
expected-e¢ cient allocation and Jensen￿ s inequality.3
One advantage of our approach is that it allows us to dispense with Schweizer￿ s
assumptions needed to ensure the existence of a saddle point ￿ in particular, we
allow for in￿nite-dimensional allocations or types, non-convex or non-compact
types spaces, and utility functions being nonlinear or discontinuous. The only
indispensable assumption proves to be convexity of the total surplus in the
allocation. A second and perhaps more important advantage is our explicit
description of a natural status-quo allocation that permits e¢ ciency.
It is interesting to note that, even when a saddle-point status-quo allocation
does exist, it generally di⁄ers from an expected-e¢ cient allocation (i.e., the
expected-e¢ cient status-quo allocation need not maximize the intermediary￿ s
expected pro￿ts). For example, consider the bilateral trade setting of Example
1, with the randomized allocation space X =
￿
(x1;x2) 2 R2
+ : x1 + x2 = 1
￿
.
This setting has a unique saddle point, which is found as follows. Given a
status-quo allocation b x = (b x1; b x2), condition (4) is satis￿ed only by the types
b ￿i whose expected e¢ cient consumption equals b xi (any other type can obtain
a greater interim net expected utility by pretending to be type b ￿i), thus we
must have F￿i(b ￿i) = b xi. To satisfy condition (5), we must have b ￿1 = b ￿2 (unless
b xi = 1 for some i and b ￿i < b ￿￿i ￿ 1, but this contradicts the previous condition
F￿i(b ￿i) = b xi = 1). The equation F1(b ￿) + F2(b ￿) = 1 then uniquely de￿nes the
saddle-point types b ￿1 = b ￿2 = b ￿ and the status-quo allocation b x = (F1(b ￿);F2(b ￿)).
[This allocation was used by Schmitz (2002) in proving his Proposition 3.] Note
that this status-quo allocation does not change if we perturb F1 and F2 in ways
that keep F1(b ￿) and F2(b ￿) ￿xed, but such perturbations generally alter the
expected-e¢ cient allocation E[￿￿(~ ￿)].
3.3 Relation to Hold-Up Models
Suppose agents choose ex ante investments and then each agent i￿ s investment
determines the distribution of his type ￿i. Then if bargaining occurs using the
mechanism constructed in our Corollary with our status-quo allocation, an e¢ -
cient investment pro￿le will emerge as an equilibrium of the ex ante game. This
follows from the analysis of Rogerson (1992), since the mechanism constructed
in the Corollary is an expected-externality mechanism.
The use of expected-e¢ cient allocation as the status quo is reminiscent of
the result of Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), who show that in the hold-up model
3Schweizer￿ s saddle-point status quo b x allows one advantage: if instead of (3) we let the
transfers be ￿i (￿) =
X
j6=i
uj (￿￿ (￿);￿j) ￿ S(b ￿i;￿￿i) + ui(b x;b ￿i), then following the argument
in Proposition 1 and the saddle-point condition (5) we can obtain inequalities (2) not just in
expectation but for each state of the world. That is, we obtain
P
i ￿i(￿) ￿ 0 for all ￿ 2 ￿, so
the mechanism never requires a monetary infusion. The mechanism is also dominant-strategy
incentive compatible (note, however, that participation is not a dominant strategy).
5in which investments in private values are followed by symmetric-information
Nash bargaining such status quo sustains e¢ cient investments in equilibrium,
provided that payo⁄s satisfy a separability condition. Our result is formally
quite distinct: e.g. our bargaining mechanism is quite di⁄erent from Nash
bargaining and the assumptions of convexity and separability are non-nested.
Yet, we think that the parallel merits further investigation.
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